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be accorded its privileges: equality of economic opportunity in areas that have in the past been the cause of dissension, access to the sea, economic right of way through foreign territory.

It is our opinion that these proposals do not in themselves constitute a sufficiently lucid and unquestionable exposition of an Allied sense of fairness towards a deluded people. The doubts inbred by continued intensive education on the part of the German government, the prejudices, the tendency to burst out in occasional *Hassgesänge*, the blind bitterness of sufferings already experienced, demand a clearer and more minutely explicative statement of Allied purposes. But these may be said to be a model or first draft of the sort of "peace terms" that would bring peace, not with the German government, but, as President Wilson has indicated his desire to do, with the German people. They imply no more than we have already offered by way of compromise, or at least implied in our offers. Their advantage is that they destroy, or tend to destroy, the suspicion of ulterior motives by a frank statement of "what the German people are going to get out of it."

President Wilson has said that we have no quarrel with the German people, that we regard them as our friends, that we wish only to rid the world, of which they, too, are members, of policies and powers that are inimical to the future peace of the world. He is not the man who has gone thus far, if he believes that these mere statements alone will arouse the German people. He knows, if he knows that "peace should rest upon the rights of peoples, not of governments," that now a new step in the work that he has promoted must be taken, and that that step must be to act upon the truth of the statements relative to the German people that he has thus far made. If they are our friends, we must provide for our friends, persuade our friends of our friendship, remove their doubts about us. If we have no quarrel with them, we must make it clear to them that we are ready to extend them the helpful hand of international friendship and good will, to provide for their future, to make them a respected and equal member of our society. If we say to them that we are going to take away from them the government which for years they have regarded with loyalty and love, under which they have grown and prospered, and in which they at present are forced to believe as their mainstay against a narrowing circle of threatening enemies—if we are to take this from them, we must, indeed, promise them something to take its place, and give them benign and unmistakable assurance of our honest intention to keep our promise.

This is our next step, unless we choose to disregard it and to go on towards ruthless, agonizing "victory" on the field of battle. We believe firmly that this choice

is no more clear to us than it is to President Wilson at this moment. We believe that only the blindness, ignorance, or prejudices of those with whom he must co-operate, and the unawakeness of those whom he, as leader of a nation, must represent, prevent him from taking this step. He cannot act alone. His acts and words must, as they have in the past, ring true to the better impulses of the great majority of America's citizens before they can be expressed. He cannot act with the ease and irresponsibility with which an excited gathering of radicals utters its pronunciamentos. Upon the clear vision and honest intentions of public opinion in the mass his ability to seize any given opportunity to a great degree depends. If we would see, at this parting of the ways, the right path chosen, the path of enlightenment; if we would have the choice made ere the opportunity for it is gone, the realization of our desires depends in an equal measure upon us. As we meet with understanding each new step taken; as we do our part in clearing the way of prejudice, bitterness, obstinate concentration on a military victory alone, we shall be taking the most direct means to an early peace compatible with the needs of all the nations and with the future establishment of government between, by, and for the nations.

THE SPECTRE OF THE RHINE

WHILE still in office as Premier of France, M. Ribot publicly declared that the allegations of Chancellor Michaelis were false in indicating that France has at present desires of conquest or will demand for protective purposes the much-discussed "boundary of the left bank of the Rhine." The ex-Premier stated clearly that the Chancellor was wilfully deceived in believing anything of the kind. "We are not following a policy of conquest and enslavement; that is not French politics." This M. Ribot knew, and Herr Michaelis may know it from him. But it recalls slightly the old story of "Don't you know that a dog that wags its tail never bites?" The answer is familiar: "Yes; you know it and I know it, but does the dog know it?"

In other words, the German Chancellor has since that time had substantial proof that Cabinets are sometimes changed overnight, and Premiers with them. It is not so much what M. Ribot declared or did not declare, but what France is thinking, and there are signs that she has not yet abandoned all thoughts of a possible "restoration" of far more than Alsace-Lorraine—a "restoration," in fact, that would all but duplicate the French Empire of 1810, which followed the Rhine from Basle north to Wesel, and thence ran northeast across the Elbe to Lübeck Bay. "The Rhine boundary," says a Paris

correspondent of *The Christian Science Monitor*, "is occupying French public opinion far more than is perhaps realized abroad." This writer goes on to call attention to the set of resolutions drawn up by such men as Professor Aulard, M. Sembat, and M. Gustave Hervé, and given publicity and approval by M. Albert Milhaud in his journal *Le Rappel*.

The argument of these members of the Radical Party is based on the declaration that France may never feel safe again from attack by Prussia unless by the Rhine boundary it is secured from a northern invasion by way of Belgium and Luxembourg. M. Milhaud's most significant statement is this:

I know M. Charpentier (vice-president of the Radical and Radical Socialist Party, but at variance with many of its members on this point) will reply that tomorrow Europe will no longer be subjected to the present danger and that she will be protected by an international *gendarmerie* which, better than any frontier, will assure our security. This is possible, but how can we be certain of it? . . . As long as Belgium and Luxembourg are not protected from invasion, we shall ourselves be directly threatened.

This is significant because it is a direct assault upon the fundamental hope of humanity at the present time. That hope is in such a conclusion of the war as will enable justice to be done in the world through the establishment of relations of mutual international confidence and respect. If that hope is futile, as M. Milhaud's cynicism would have us believe, then why look for peace? What avail would it be? Does he imagine that international relations based on fear and distrust will be any better than they have been for the last hundreds and thousands of years? Does he hope that his Rhine boundary will keep out Germany any better than his present one did? Says another writer, in the Paris *Temps*:

The attempt of Germany has failed; will German secret diplomacy win what she has failed to obtain by force of arms? It depends on whether we insure at last the security of our country, and erect an effective barrier between Germany and ourselves and our allies. Is it too much to ask, after the suffering and the ruin of six invasions in the course of a century and a half?

The answer is, of course, that it is—far too much. It is too much to ask that a new era shall be ushered in with the same loathsome auspices that brought to all past eras the fruits of their sowing. French Radicals and many others fail to recognize the unmistakable sign of these times—that is, that the day has come when mankind to be safe must put down barriers; to prevent treachery they must trust their neighbors; to insure the rights of their friends they must respect the rights of their unfriends, if not of their enemies; to bring peace to the world they must cease to expect and prepare for

war. If this is too high a moral stand for the world to take, then it must take a lower stand than it has taken since the Dark Ages. We have gone too far with invention, with commerce, with finance, with diplomacy, with war to permit us any longer to mingle amity and shrewdness, frankness and suspicion, peace and hostility. The step before us is towards international organization of justice and the government of the world. There is no step back, only an abyss. If we falter now—if we permit the influence of any such direful figments of imagination as the Spectre of the Rhine—we shall come close to earning the woe that will betide us. There is a sterner lesson than the present one waiting for us if we cannot learn from this.

THE RISING TIDE

IN SPITE of the wild destruction on the western front, the debacle in the region around Riga, and the killings north of Triest, the tide of the sea of peace has reached its lowest ebb and turned, we believe, on the flood. From a military point of view, the war has been won by the Entente Allies. It is now only a matter of time. The resources of the enemies of the Central Powers are too great for any other interpretation of the situation. The Germans are wise enough to know this; of that none can doubt. It is for this reason that we hear so much of peace, especially out of Central Europe.

The first great encouraging evidence that this is so was revealed in the German Reichstag Thursday, July 19, when the German Chancellor accepted and recommended the following five conditions of peace:

1. The re-establishment of the original boundaries of the German Empire as they were when the war began, and the restoration of the German colonies captured in the war, or at least territorial adjustment on this basis;
2. A guarantee against political domination, and economic, financial or other exploiting monopolies of weak countries by strong nations;
3. A guarantee against boycotts or excommunications of strong nations by other strong nations or groups of nations;
4. A guarantee of the freedom of the seas from national armed vessels and from the menace of national fortifications;
5. An international organization of a juridical and legally limited character to render these guarantees effective.

Of these five requisites, only the first and last will be capable of adjustment in the treaty of peace. The guarantees demanded under two, three, and four are really guarantees against abnormal political processes which may occur at any time, and which, therefore, require for their treatment the fixed and continuous regulation of an international body having the necessary jurisdiction and powers for such regulation.

It seemed to us at the time, therefore, that the German peace conditions could have been met if the belligerent nations had seen their way to agree upon the mat-